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We investigate the link between the regulation of control transactions and the institutional and corporate 
features of public companies, by analyzing the massive delisting activity in the Romanian capital market. The 
peculiar ownership reforms involving a large number of listed companies offer a unique opportunity to test 
Bebchuk and Roe’s (2000) theory of path dependence. Over time, the Romanian authorities have undertaken 
wide-ranging institutional reforms, most of which favoring blockholders over small and dispersed shareholders. 
Our  empirical  approach,  based  on  logit  and  duration  models,  allows  us  to  analyze  the  evolution  of  public 
companies over this period and sheds light on the likely events causing the eclipse of frontier emerging markets. 
Our main findings reveal that delisting is more likely to occur when (i) the shareholdings acquired from the 
privatization authority by circumventing the capital  market are high; (ii) the company experiences frequent 
takeover bids; and (iii) the stock liquidity is low. 
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Introduction  
 
The  question  of  how  to  deal  with  conflicts  among  the  various  protagonists  of  public 
companies has been recently restated within the context of the ownership reforms undergone 
in the European emerging markets. The vast privatization programs addressed to millions of 
citizens in the early nineties and the subsequent trading of distributed free shares on new 
revived markets were viewed as genuine steps forward to the implementation of financial 
discipline  in  deficient  corporations.  The  very  existence  of  small  shareholders,  often 
confusedly called “dispersed shareholders”, had been considered for a longtime a trump card 
in the reforming process involving former state-owned enterprises. While a large number of 
shareholders  could  justify  to  some  extent  the  use  of  the  ‘public  corporations’  label,  it 
represents  at  best  a  sine  qua  non  condition  for  restructuring  privatized  companies. 
Particularly,  corporate  refocusing  on  higher  valued  uses  of  resources  asks  often  for  the 
involvement of institutional shareholders or industries’ leaders, likely to have expertise in the 
area of financial engineering and substantial financial resources for acquiring the control in 
those companies. The ownership structure “majority owner – small individual shareholders” 
originated  from  partial  or  complete  privatization  was  a  compromise  that  further  raised  a 
growing  debate  about  the  role  of  regulation  governing  property  rights  and  the  adequate 
corporate governance mechanisms that could address conflicts opposing market players. In 
this respect, facilitating the emergence of a sound private sector requires specific regulatory 
measures insulating minority shareholders from the expropriation by the controlling ones. In 
emerging markets, the authorities considered that leveling the playing field among corporate 
claimants  could  be  achieved  simply  by  transposing  some  of  the  rules  applicable  in  well-
established financial markets. Whether the “imported” legal texts have reflected the evolving 
domestic  institutional  issues  and  have  had  the  expected  wealth  effects  remains  an  open 
question whose answers are likely to be contextual.  
In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the combination of circumstances in which the 
corporate structures have emerged and evolved provides singular opportunities to analyze the 
design of explicit rights of minority shareholders in block-holder regimes. The continuous 
dilution  inflicted  to  minority  shareholders  in  public  companies  led  the  Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)  to  recommend  delisting  as  one  of  the 
remedies that could restore the confidence in the private economic sector of some transition 
economies. We address this issue by focusing on the main institutional and corporate factors 
explaining the decision to change the companies’ public status, before and after the OECD   4
report  (2001)  on  the  Romanian  capital  market.  In  this  respect,  we  analyze  the  massive 
delisting  activity  on  the  over-the-counter  market  RASDAQ  (Romanian  Association  of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotation) between 1997 and 2006. Our evidence shows that 
the controversy around shareholders rights finds its roots in the proliferation of deals with 
large blocks made by circumventing the market. It reveals that private status -- considered as 
an extreme form of concentrated ownership -- depends on the initial ownership structures, 
thus  confirming  the  structure-driven  path  dependence  conjecture  of  Bebchuck  and  Roe 
(1999).  
We  posit  that  the  institutional  choices  made  in  the  early  stages  of  privatization 
dramatically influenced not only the balance of power between large and small shareholders, 
but also the subsequent market regulations that could have corrected the adverse effects of 
some erroneous initial administrative decisions. The agency conflicts between shareholders 
compelled  to  restructure  and  those  whose  simple  presence  is  the  essence  of  the  financial 
visibility of companies were exacerbated by the ample wave of abandoning public markets. 
This polemic has been intensified by some notable exceptions from the mandatory bid rule, as 
well as by a series of amendments to the valuation criteria of minority rights in going private 
transactions. Such legal details enabled the internal rent-seeking behavior thus encouraging 
the persistence of large block-holdings. Taken together, the legal standards and contextual 
evidence on delisting presented in this paper allow arguing that corporate regulation is an 
important source of path dependence in the country’s pattern of corporate structures rather 
than an effective response to conjectural corporate governance failures. 
Prior studies on buyouts frame some non mutual exclusive hypotheses individualizing the 
main  factors  likely  to  drive  the  delisting  decision  (see  Renneboog  et  al.,  2007,  for  an 
extensive review). Most of the findings used as benchmark concern the LBO waves that have 
taken place in developed markets. The studies that have examined the likelihood of delisting 
in the European emerging markets reveal the limited scope of several hypotheses and point to 
the investigation of specific characteristics pertaining to regulation that should bear directly 
on  the  decision  to  go  private.  Atanasov  et  al.  (2009)  provide  evidence  that  the  minority 
freeze–out at large discounts proliferated on the Bulgarian market represents an extreme form 
of financial tunneling facilitated by the poor legal protection. Jackowicz and Kowalewski 
(2005)  confirm  that  agency  conflicts  occurred  in  the  post-privatization period  explain  the 
delisting  decision  in  Poland.  While  similar  in  intuition,  this  study  distinguishes  from  the 
previous works in that it addresses the concern that corporate governance regulation could 
dissimulate the protection of minority shareholders in emerging markets behind “politically   5
correct”  texts.  Our  approach  exploits  hand-collected  firm-level  characteristics  and 
institutional  features  for  3,321  public  companies.  Particularly,  the  empirical  specifications 
controlling  for  the  outcomes  of  privatization,  takeovers  and  share  capital  changes  on  the 
decision of whether to remain public of selected companies give additional insights on the 
exposure  of  minority  shareholders  to  potential  expropriation,  which  could  enhance  our 
understanding of emerging markets finance. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we briefly present the 
history of corporate structures formation and market regulation in Romania, with a focus on 
the main challenges raised by the implementation of fair price standards in freeze-out bids.  
Section  3  outlines  the  main  testable  hypotheses,  presents  the  empirical  methodology  and 
describes our sample selection procedure and the selected independent variables. In Section 4, 
we discuss the results of logistic and duration analyses explaining the likelihood a company 
changes its public status into a private one. The final section concludes. 
 
2. Institutional setting and legal provisions regulating control transactions 
2.1. Initial patterns of corporate ownership structures 
 
The  peculiar  experience  of  the  Romanian  stock  market  has  been  fuelled  by  the 
controversial mass privatization policy. Unlike other countries from CEE, where the transfer 
of State property into private hands involved private financial intermediaries that competed 
for collecting privatization vouchers (e.g. Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria), in Romania 
the authorities preferred to institute a direct contact between companies and citizens. In this 
respect, each adult citizen could exchange the voucher received for free for the shares of a 
single company. In 1995, when the mass privatization program was re-launched, they could 
opt for one of 3,905 companies included in the official list, based on some basic information 
(industry code, share capital, sales, gross profit and the maximum percentage of share capital 
to  be  privatized).  During  the  subscription  period,  the  vouchers  could  not  be  bilaterally 
exchanged  and  thus,  nobody  could  gather  more  vouchers.  At  the  end  of  the  subscription 
period, the Privatization Authority (AVAS) assigned a certain number of shares to individual 
shareholders based on the subscription degree: (1) if the offer was over-subscribed, it made a 
pro-rata  distribution  without  exceeding  the  initial  offered  percentage;  (2)  if  the  offer  was 
under-subscribed, it allotted the corresponding shares, while keeping the unsubscribed ones. 
Those  who  could  not  decide  themselves  were  allowed  to  exchange  their  privatization 
vouchers for the shares of one of the five private property funds administratively created in 
1991. The stock market emerged at this stage of the restructuring process as a “natural” result   6
of the mass privatization program. All companies included in that program were compulsory 
listed  either  on  the  Bucharest  Stock  Exchange  (1995)  or  on  the  over-the  counter  market, 
RASDAQ  (1997).  The  distributed  shares  to  citizens  formed  the  free  float  of  companies, 
considered from then-on public companies. According to the number of listed companies, the 
Romanian market has become over night the largest market of the region.
1 Nonetheless, the 
mass  privatization  concerning  thousands  of  industrial  companies  created  18  million  small 
shareholders but very few companies with dispersed shareholdings. Earle and Telegdy (2002) 
report for the end of 1998 a mean and median ownership of shareholders who received shares 
within the mass privatization program of 24.5% and 18.4%, respectively. As, on average, the 
individual  shareholders  could  not  make  any  corporate  decision  even  with  perfect 
coordination, they have been for a long time regarded as a class of tolerated passive investors. 
Paradoxically, the stock market was viewed as a platform were “voucher” shareholders could 
sell their holdings and thus enjoy the last free lunch proposed by the government, rather than 
an institutional structure facilitating capital raising.  
Despite its scope, the mass privatization was only one piece in the puzzling restructuring 
program of the Romanian government. Meanwhile, the Privatization Authority (AVAS) had 
been continuing to sell the State property to individual and institutional investors either by 
means of direct deals or market bids. According to AVAS data, 9,258 blocks were dealt 
between 1993 and 2003, more than 45% transactions involving majority stakes.   
The broad picture of the very way the AVAS holdings were sold credibly signals that the 
Romanian government aimed principally at attracting large investors. While investments in 
controlling  positions  arouse  the  interest  in  performing  the  needed  changes,  the  pervasive 
block-holdings obstruct the portfolio investments, calling thus into question the endurance of 
market  structures.  Fama  and  Jensen  (1983),  Maupin  et  al.  (1984),  Jansen  and  Kleimeier 
(2003), Atanasov et al.  (2009) argue that high ownership concentration makes companies 
decide to go private. According to this broad picture a gradual eclipse of public companies in 
blockholders regimes is reasonably predictable. Our contention is that the Romanian stock 
market  is  an  excellent  candidate  for  identifying  and  analyzing  the  peculiar  conditions  in 
frontier emerging markets
2 that could have a major influence on delisting decisions. 
                                                 
1 Berglöf and Pajuste (2003) and Pajuste (2002) present a comparative analysis among the markets of Central 
and Eastern Europe which could provide the reader with further details. 
2 In order for a market to be considered as “emerging” several criteria have to be met: (1) the market is localized 
in  an  emerging  country;  (2)  the  market  does  not  exhibit  financial  depth;  (3)  there  exist  broad  based 
discriminatory controls for non-domiciled investors; (4) it is characterized by a lack of transparency, depth, 
market regulation, and operational efficiency.  Wilshire  Consulting provides an annual report classifying the 
emerging markets in two distinct categories: (1) “investable” emerging markets; and (2) “frontier” emerging   7
2.2 Imported or tailored corporate rules?  
 
The vast majority of companies listed on the Romanian capital market were under the 
control of a major shareholder from the very first day of their public episode. The low free 
floats had a negative impact on trading and created scope for market price manipulations that 
further deepened the market illiquidity. The OECD (2001) report provides anecdotic evidence 
on expropriation practices used by major shareholder in small- and medium-sized enterprises, 
especially changes to share capital and related-parties transactions. Under this view, the main 
redress  available  for  minority  shareholders  was  to  create  the  premises  for  ownership 
consolidation and delisting of illiquid companies by instituting an equitable system of tender 
offers.  In  this  respect,  the  OECD  recommended  to  the  Romanian  market  authority  to 
determine  a  reasonable  threshold  triggering  the  squeeze-out  procedure  and  assure  the 
implementation of a fair price standard. 
In  Romania,  the  control  transactions  between  private  investors  have  been  regulated 
drawing on the EU legislation. According to the regulation enacted from the very capital 
market inception, an investor must make a non discriminatory voluntary or mandatory tender 
offer whenever she seeks of acquiring 33% and 50% of the voting rights in a listed company, 
respectively. As a practical consequence of this rule, more than 1,500 takeover bids leading to 
the  acquisition  or  reinforcement  of  control  have  been  approved  by  the  market  authority 
(CNVM) over a 10-year span. However, before 2001 a public company was allowed to delist 
only (a) after concluding a tender offer initiated in the name of the majority of shareholders to 
buy-back the outstanding shares; and (b) if the General Assembly of  Shareholders of the 
company having afterwards fewer than 500 shareholders or a share capital lower than ROL 1 
billion  decided  to  transform  the  company  into  a  private  one.  The  main  objective  of  this 
regulation was to maintain a minimal functionality of the capital market on behalf of small 
shareholders willing to trade their stocks. Beginning with 2002, the updated takeover rules, in 
line with the recommendations made in the OECD (2001) report, state the ‘obligation’ for the 
largest shareholder owning at least 90% of the capital to cash-out the minority shareholders. 
The law regulating the capital market promulgated in 2004 redefines this ‘obligation’ as a 
‘right’ of controlling shareholder owning 95% or having received more than 90% of the target 
shares in a previous takeover bid to take the company private.  
                                                                                                                                                         
markets.  The  aim  of  this  classification  is  to  identify  those  markets  that  are  able  to  support  institutional 
investments and not to evaluate the current attractiveness for investment managers. For the time being, the only 
European emerging markets classified as “investable” are Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic.   8
However, the appraisal remedy granted to the minority shareholders has raised a lot of 
controversy. From 1996 to 2002, the buyout price was based exclusively on the net asset 
value. Beginning with March 2002, when the first draft of a new market law was proposed, 
the  calculation  details  of  the  exit  price  had  been  changed  at  least  five  times  until  the 
promulgation  of  the  law.  According  to  its  final  version,  the  buyout  price  had  to  be 
compounded based on three distinct values: (1) the average market price in the 12 months 
preceding the going private transaction; (2) the maximum price paid by the acquirer for the 
target  shares  over  the  same  period;  and  (3)  the  equity  per  shares  valuated  based  on  the 
International  Accounting  Standards.  The  ambiguity  created  by  the  frequent  change  of  the 
market law made some major shareholders interpret their obligation only in respect to the 
buyout  of  controlled  company  but  not  to  the  minimum  price  to  be  paid  to  minority 
shareholders.  In  2004,  the  market  authority  modified  once  again  the  squeeze-out  price 
provision that states this time that the price paid in a previous tender offer in which at least 
90% of the remaining shares were tendered is a fair price.3 Unless the controlling shareholder 
does make use of his right in the next three months following the acquisition of such a stake, 
the fair price will be valued by an independent expert. Besides, according to the market law of 
2004, the minority shareholders were given the right to sell-out the remaining shares4 to the 
dominant shareholder owning 95% of share capital either according to the terms of the bid 
preceding the acquisition of such a stake5 or based on the valuation made by an external 
expert. However, if an external valuation of the minority holdings is necessary, the small 
shareholder contesting the bidding price is obliged to bear the valuation costs. When small 
shareholders are wealth constrained and the valuation costs are likely to be higher than stock 
value, such a fairness principle becomes simply unfeasible. For achieving a comprehensive 
view  on  the  scope  of  market  regulation,  we  present  in  Appendix  2  a  table  detailing  the 
takeover and securities legal texts addressing those aspects. 
The acquisition literature argues that providing an acquirer with a squeeze-out right is an 
alternative to voluntary dilution when target shareholdings are dispersed (see Yarrow, 1985). 
In such cases, “allocational” acquisitions are possible only if acquirers can either limit the 
                                                 
3 According to the acquisition literature, establishing a price for the going private transaction equal to that paid in 
the previous stage of a two-stage bid conditioned by the acquisition of 90% of the voting rights is argued by the 
free rider behaviour of atomistic shareholders. If the final price were higher than this limit, all the minority 
shareholders would wait the final stage of the offer. Besides, as each stockholder has a choice of whether to 
tender the shares to prospective investor, such a price could not be considered coercive.  
4 According to Holderness and Sheenan (1988), such a fair price provision restricts ex-ante the scope of bidders’ 
opportunism and insulates the small investors from excessive expropriation.  
5 An extensive discussion about the mirroring characteristics of the rights of controlling shareholder and minority 
shareholders, respectively, is provided in Burkart and Panunzi (2004).    9
access of atomistic shareholders to post-acquisition gains (via dilution, private benefits of 
control or squeeze out rights) or build a toehold in the target. The exclusion mechanisms have 
a socially desirable function because they allow the market for corporate control to play its 
disciplinary  role.  However,  on  capital  markets  where  blockholdings  prevail,  the  regulator 
should first assess whether acquirers and target shareholders still play a zero-sum game, in 
which the last ones systematically have positive gains. 
Furthermore, the valuation criterion based on the previous bidding prices seems highly 
inadequate in emerging markets. According to the “theory of bid capture” (Bates et al., 2006), 
the minority shareholders need protection mainly because of the ability of major shareholder 
to structure binding bids. The freeze-out right is regarded as an important source of private 
benefits, whenever the controlling shareholder uses private information having a downside 
effect on the company value. In illiquid markets, the investors possessing private information 
have the ability to exploit the inefficiencies caused by the low free float (Lehn and Poulsen, 
1989). Bebchuk and Kahan (2000) argue that there is an adverse selection effect that results 
from the use of market prices as benchmark for no freeze-out value of minority shares.   
In  emerging  markets,  the  freeze-out  regulation  should  address,  besides  financial 
considerations,  the  matter  of  “fair  dealing”  that  implies  analyzing  how  some  control 
transaction, including privatization, were initiated, structured, and disclosed to the minority 
shareholders in the previous stages. Particularly, the mandatory bid rule, while deemed to be 
public regarding, was tailored so that to meet privatization objectives and the interests of 
groups  dominating  the  corporate  realm.  Thus,  an  investor  who  buys  directly  from  the 
Romanian privatization authority a stake that triggers the mandatory bid rule is exempted 
from the obligation to make a tender offer for the remaining shares. These direct deals, called 
in the legal text ‘excepted transactions’, allow  the investors to build up high toeholds in 
public  targets,  even  to  control  them,  outside  the  market  mechanism.  Under  these 
circumstances,  the  market  prices  cannot  convey  any  information  about  the  valuation  of 
potential bidders. Pop (2006) stresses the ineffectiveness of the mandatory public offers made 
on  the  Romanian  market  from  the  point  of  view  of  minority  shareholders  of  the  target 
company,  especially  when  a  dominant  shareholder  exists  and  the  insider  trading  is 
unbounded. In public to private transactions the minority shareholders run the danger to be 
under-compensated  despite  the  premium  paid  above  the  market  price.  Consequently,  in 
markets fraught with opportunities to exert substantive coercion on minority shareholders, the 
authorities should avoid imposing the price paid in the previous tender offers as the exclusive 
benchmark of fair value.   10
A way of avoiding the coercion by the buyer would consist in a non-waiveable ‘majority 
of  the  minority’  condition
6,  which  means  that  the  transaction  must  be  approved  by  the 
majority of minority shareholders. As the interference of the privatization authority within 
control transactions could involve a degree of tension between controlling shareholder and 
minority shareholders, such a legal option becomes valuable especially when the squeeze-out 
right is acquired following a direct deal with AVAS
7.  
A protective legislation would also provide the minority shareholders with a judicial 
review under the entire fairness standard, that is a remedy allowing the oppressed minority not 
only to receive the value of their shares as assessed by the Court but also damages if this price 
exceeds the freeze-out price established unilaterally by the controlling shareholder. 
Gilson  and  Gordon  (2003)  state  that  one  of  the  main  conditions  that  could  make  a 
freeze-out tender offer by a controlling shareholder non-coercive, regards the involvement of 
independent  directors  in  the  process  of  decision  making  of  non-controlling  shareholders. 
Particularly,  these  ones  should  hire  their  own  advisers  and  disclose  adequate  information 
about the company that entitles minority shareholders to an enhanced price. However, such a 
redress solution has had limited ground on the Romanian market, as far as it is unlikely for 
public companies to also have independent directors. 
Because of the regular changes of legal details and fair price standards, as well as the 
looser  intervention  of  the  market  authority  against  the  abuses  proliferated  by  majority 
shareholders, we wonder whether benchmarking regulation against modern takeover laws is 
sufficient to meet the general objectives of “efficiency” and “fairness” in minority freeze-outs.  
 
3. Data, Sample Selection and Empirical Methodology 
Maximizing the firm value often asks the revision of the form of business organization of 
firms from public to private ownership. A going private transaction usually refers to a buyout 
transaction  of  a  public  company  by  one  or  a  handful  of  the  target’s  shareholders,  its 
management  or  external  investors.  Typically,  the  remaining  stocks  are  paid  in  cash, 
sometimes raised by issuing debt securities backed by the target’s assets and serviced by its 
operating cash flow. The intent of offeror to take private a company is materialized in a tender 
offer for the outstanding shares. One can prefer a two-step deal having similar economic 
                                                 
6 Slovin and Sushka (1998) found that such a requirement does not necessarily improve the gains of minority 
shareholders in buyouts where no change in control is involved. 
7 Usually, whenever the total number of shares submitted by minority shareholders allows the offeror to get at 
least 90% of the total number of shares, the acquirer  may effect a short-form  merger at the same price or 
exchange ratio. It is referred to as being a “waivable condition”.   11
terms:  (1)  a  tender  offer  directly  to  the  target’s  stockholders;  (2)  conditioned  on  the 
acquisition of 90% of the target’s stock, a squeeze out of minority stockholders who did not 
tender in the previous offer. While it is acknowledged that going private transactions create 
some benefits, there is a broad disagreement around the sources of the gain arising by reason 
of  leaving  the  market.  In  the  studies  conducted  on  developed  markets  the  following 
hypotheses were tested: (1) the agency costs-related hypotheses, including the free cash flow 
hypothesis, incentive realignment hypothesis, and control hypothesis; (2) the undervaluation 
hypothesis; (3) the takeover defense hypothesis; (4) the transaction costs hypothesis; (5) the 
tax benefit hypothesis; and (6) the wealth transfer hypothesis (see Renneboog et al., 2007). A 
broad  reading  of  international  evidence  shows  that  the  assumptions  made  in  the  related 
literature  for  explaining  why  the  private  status  is  preferred  to  the  public  one  are  not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. To get a better view on the range of conditions likely to defy 
those provisions, we analyze empirically whether specific trades (privatization, public offers, 
and capital transactions) could explain the choice for a private status of controlled companies, 
as well as the timing of the delisting decision.  
  From the universe of 3,596 companies that were delisted between 1997 and 2006, we 
exclude all those justifying their decision based on the following reasons: (1) merger with 
other companies; (2) divestiture; (3) bankruptcy; (4) radiation from the Commerce Registry; 
(5)  administrative  decision  of  the  market  authority;  (6)  transfer  to  the  Bucharest  Stock 
Exchange.  We  further  delete  the  companies  having  the  one-digit  NACE  code  “A.  – 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing”, as far as during the analyzed period the judicial regime of 
the land had been ambiguous. Consequently, we identify 2,081 delisted companies having as 
stated argument on the official market reports either “withdrawn” or “closely held company” 
reasons. In order to reveal the rationale behind the decision to delist, we construct a control 
sample,  which  includes  1,240  industrial  companies  that  were  still  listed  on  RASDAQ  on 
December 31
st, 2006. As in the previous case, all agricultural firms are excluded from control 
sample. Of 3,321 observations meeting the selection criteria in some empirical specifications 
we  lose  592  observations  because  financial  reports  or  detailed  market  data  for  those 
companies were not publicly available.  
For each of these companies we collect detailed information about privatization, public 
offers, share capital changes, stock market data, as well as financial data during the public 
status  episode.  In  order  to  construct  our  independent  variables,  we  explored  and  cross 
examined  several  sources  of  information:  RASDAQ,  the  Romanian  Minister  of  Finance, 
AVAS,  CNVM,  and  Romanian  Universe  Database.  The  stock  market  raw  information   12
regarding the transaction history of the peer companies was kindly provided by Broker S.A., a 
Romanian investment firm.  
As our main inquiry is whether the privatization policy of AVAS influenced the decision 
to take a company private, we construct three alternative variables: (1) AVAS_major, which is 
a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the size of the block sold directly by AVAS exceeds 
50% and 0 otherwise; (2) AVAS_maxdir, representing the maximum size of the block dealt 
with AVAS by circumventing the stock market; and (3) Privatization Rounds, defined as the 
total number of privatization rounds in which the company was involved. To test whether the 
ability to restructure, or conversely to divert resources, depends on the identity of the major 
shareholder, we include in our empirical models two dummy variables, ESOP and Individual, 
that  equal  1  if  the  maximum  block  of  AVAS  was  sold  to  the  company’s  employees  or 
individuals, respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
The  takeover  activity  is  captured  by  constructing  the  following  variables:  (1)  First 
Bid_Submitted representing the ratio of the number of shares submitted to the number of 
targeted  shares  in  the  first  takeover  bid;  (2)  Nb.  Bids,  representing  the  total  number  of 
takeover bids made for the company's shares; (3) Bid_Av Price, expressed as the ratio of 
maximum biding price to average price over the considered period.  
To control for market conditions, we used the Stock Turnover variable, measuring the 
ability of firms to attract the market participants’ interest, computed as the ratio of trading 
volume to the average number of outstanding shares. The denominator of this variable is 
compound by taking into account the duration between every two subsequent changes to share 
capital made over the considered period. Besides, we control for the stock market conditions 
by including in the analysis the proxy Market Trend, computed as the ratio of the closing 
price on the last transaction day of the considered period to the average market price over the 
same period. For the peer companies, we construct the market specific variables with respect 
to the 31
st of December 2005, in order to avoid an implicit bias in the size of transaction 
volume linked to their continual public status. 
In the related literature it is argued that new share issues might represent a subtle strategy 
for adjusting the position of large shareholders in the detriment of the small ones. The OECD 
(2001)  report  provides  anecdotic  evidence  about  practices  aiming  to  dilute  minority 
shareholders’ rights through share capital increases without prior revaluation of existing assets 
or through in-kind contribution of the majority shareholders. A priori increasing the share 
capital does not necessarily imply an ownership adjustment. Over the analyzed period all 
listed companies were allowed to revalue their assets because of the losses incurred from high   13
inflation. In order to update the assets value, the shareholders could decide to modify either 
the number of outstanding shares or their face value. In the last case, companies may not have 
to issue any additional shares. As we have no information about the evolution of ownership 
structure, we control for financial tunneling by considering two proxies (1) the number of 
times a company changed its total number of shares, Nb. Capital Changes; and (2) the total 
percentage share capital increases between the listing date and the delisting or “censored” 
date, Capital Change. 
The  relationship  between  the  financial  characteristics  and  probability  of  delisting  is 
expressed by the following variables: (1) Size, the logarithm of total assets; (2) ROE, which 
whenever the equity value is negative this ratio is considered –100%; (3) Leverage computed 
as the ratio of debt to total assets; (4) Assets Turnover, equal to sales divided by total assets; 
and  (5)  FATA,  representing  the  proportion  of  fixed  assets  in  total  assets.  All  financial 
variables are based on the financial statements reported by companies at the end of the year 
preceding the delisting / “censored” year.  
  In order to analyze the determinants of the delisting process for the Romanian companies 
listed on the OTC market RASDAQ, we use three different empirical specifications. The first 




where  F(.)  represents  the  cumulative  logistic  distribution,  X1,  …,  Xn  a set  of  explanatory 
variables, and  
. 
  Our second specification is based on a Cox proportional hazard (PH), which allows for 
censoring in the sense that not all companies included in our sample were delisted during the 
analyzed period (see Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980, for more details on the estimation of 
survival models). A crucial assumption behind the Cox proportional hazards specification is 
that the hazard ratio is proportionally distributed over time. To evaluate this assumption, we 
performed a test of nonzero slope in a generalized linear regression of the scaled Schoenfeld 
residuals  on  various  functions  of  time  (see  Grambsch  and  Therneau,  1994,  for  additional 
details). The test is equivalent to evaluate the hypothesis that the log hazard ratio function is 
constant over time. After estimating each Cox proportional hazard model, we generated the 
matrix of Schoenfeld residuals (scaled adjusted), tested the null hypothesis that the slope is   14
equal  to  zero  for  each  covariate  in  various  models,  and  performed  the  global  test 
recommended by Grambsch and Therneau (1994). Although the null hypothesis of zero slope 
in the appropriate regressions was accepted for some individual covariates of interest, the 
global  test  indicated  in  most  cases  deviations  from  the  proportional  hazards  assumption. 
Consequently,  our  third  specification  is  based  on  an  alternative  modeling  choice:  the 
accelerated failure-time (AFT) model. The AFT specification supposes a linear relationship 
between the logarithm of the survival time and the covariates. As usual, the assumption on the 
distributional  form  of  the  error  term  determines  the  class  of  the  regression  models. 
Particularly,  assuming  a  normal,  logistic,  extreme-value  or  three-parameter  gamma 
distribution  for  the  error  term,  the  corresponding  regression  models  are  lognormal,  log-
logistic, Weibull and generalized gamma, respectively. In the present paper, we opted for the 
generalized  gamma model for two distinct reasons. First, as it is well known, the hazard 
function implied by the generalized gamma specification is extremely flexible, allowing for a 
large specter of possible shapes (in particular, the Weibull and lognormal distributions can be 
viewed as special cases of the generalized gamma density). Second, to discriminate between 
various  AFT  models,  we  computed  for  each  model  the  log  likelihood  and  the  Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). According to our comparisons, the gamma generalized model 
appears to be the best-fitting model (i.e. exhibiting the largest log likelihood) and the one with 
the smallest AIC value. 
  The two classes of regression models used in our empirical analysis (logit and survival -
- PH & AFT -- models) help to shed light on two distinct facets of our main research question. 
On the one hand, the logit methodology allows us to conclude on the unconditional predictive 
power of the various determinants of the decision to delist. On the other hand, the survival 
analysis  allows  us  to  obtain  estimates  of  the  impact  of  the  covariates  on  the  conditional 
probability to delist; that is, the probability to delist conditional on being listed to a certain 
point in time and exhibiting certain values for the covariates in the previous period. The later 
methodological issue is highly relevant to the literature on the decision of public companies to 
delist. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
The  empirical  results  reveal  a  positive  and  significant  relationship  in  all  logit 
specifications between the variables used as proxies for the Government involvement in the 
course of capital concentration and the probability of going private. Firms involved in direct 
privatization end with lesser investor participation, as long as the block owned by AVAS is   15
dealt with a single or a small group of investors. This result lends support to Bates et al.’s 
(2006)  thesis  that  the  likelihood  of  having  minority  shareholders  “left  out  in  the  cold” 
increases whenever there is discrepancy between them and the controlling shareholder. By 
linking this result to the theory of bid capture, we validate indirectly the control hypothesis 
indicating  that  the  delisting  decision  and  wealth  of  minority  shareholders  are  negatively 
related. While highly significant in the logistic regression, the size of the block obtained by 
avoiding the market, irrespective of its level, has no impact on the duration of public status. 
However, this result is of common sense. On the one hand, in closing-held companies few 
private investors would accept to continue to have the Government as partner. On the other 
hand, bearing in mind the strong dealing position of AVAS it is hard to imagine that it could 
behave like a usual shareholder and tender voluntarily its shares in a regular takeover bid. The 
stylized facts show that AVAS has always cashed out its minority positions in distinct deals 
and  has  defined  distinct  transactions  terms.  A  similar  effect  of  the  Government  stakes  is 
reported in Atanasov et al. (2005), in their analysis of the Bulgarian market but they explain 
their  results  by  political  costs  arguments.  As  direct  privatization  leads  to  high  ownership 
concentration, the shareholder base of companies cannot be unexpectedly changed. Under 
these circumstances, the takeover defense hypothesis is less plausible in our case. 
The  probability  and  conditional  probability  to  delist  are  lower  when  companies  are 
controlled  by  employees’  association  compared  with  those  firms  where  AVAS’s 
shareholdings were dealt with industrial companies or financial institutions. The negative sign 
of  this  variable  can  be  explained  by  the  peculiar  conditions  stated  in  the  privatization 
contracts concluded between AVAS and employees’ associations. In the majority of cases 
employees could defer the complete payment of the negotiated acquisition price for several 
years but were forbidden to resale the acquired block to other investors during the teasing 
period.  
The  significant  positive  effect  of  First  Bid_Submitted  shows  that  companies  whose 
shareholders massively  accepted the  conditions of the first takeover bid are taken private 
sooner than their counterparts. The positive and significant coefficient of the Nb. Bids variable 
reveals that when bidders intend to obtain the whole participation in the target, the company 
has more chances to end its public episode. 
The change in the organizational form becomes less likely for companies that modify the 
total number of shares more often. The sign of variable Nb. Capital Changes is negative and 
highly significant in all empirical specifications. We have also controlled for the amplitude of   16
these  changes  through  the  ratio  of  the  number  of  outstanding  shares  before 
delisting/“censored” date to the initial number of outstanding shares, but the estimated results 
based on this variable are not conclusive. One possible explanation could be that in the case of 
very intensive assets firms, the revaluation process could cause a steep increase in the total 
number of shares. As in such cases existing shareholders receive free shares proportionally 
with their holdings, such a decision could be followed by improved market liquidity. Another 
way of explaining why the estimated coefficients of this variable are not significant concerns 
the distribution of dividend shares. It is worth underlying that the two types of decisions 
leading to the increase of share capital do not trigger any change in the ownership structure. 
Even if the stylized facts reported by the OECD show that the dilution inflicted by major 
shareholders trough in-kind contributions was a recurrent practice in small and medium size 
enterprises, tracing such strategies based only on the history of capital changes is practically 
impossible. In order to distinguish between “benign” and “malign” operations, we would have 
to  control  for  the  ownership  structure  before  and  after  such  an  event  (unavailable  data). 
However, when we control for this influence in the hazard models, our intuition is confirmed 
by the results; that is, within companies experiencing a steeper increase in the total number of 
shares the decision to end the public episode is made sooner than in the peer companies. 
As one of the main concerns of our study is to test how the conflicts of interest over the 
use of companies’ resources influence the decision to go private or dark, in the empirical 
models we control for financial conditions. Financial literature predicts that companies that 
expand their activity but sacrifice the profitability are more likely to face conflicts of interest. 
By using the operating decision against small shareholders’ interest, the blockholders seek to 
affect minority discounts paid in going to private transactions or to simply influence their 
willingness to delist the company. Gilson and Gordon (2003) argue that by taking private the 
company, the large shareholders can capture the capitalized value of future private benefits 
over the value of a non-controlling share. Besides, there is a strong link between those gains 
and the level of benefits likely to be expropriated by operational means. If so, the positive 
sign  of  Assets  Turnover  and  the  non-significant  influence  of  the  financial  performance 
(proxied  by  ROE)  can  be  interpreted  as  an  indication  of  the  use  of  such  stratagems,  i.e. 
disadvantageous transfer prices between the public companies and other companies owned by 
the  controlling  shareholder.  The  positive  and  significant  coefficient  of  the  FATA  variable 
lends support to the conjecture that companies in which expropriation behavior is more likely 
choose to leave the stock market and exit sooner than their competitors. As companies listed 
on the stock market were seriously undervalued, significant gains could be realized by taking   17
over the company  and  by selling afterwards its physical assets by pieces. This finding is 
consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  dilution  inflicted  to  the  small  shareholders  can  be  a 
practice associated with the decision to go private. The low market capitalization made the 
debt a useless source of financing and going to private transactions neutral events with respect 
to taxes. Consequently, the conditions needed for testing the traditional tax benefit and the 
wealth transfer (from bondholders) hypotheses are not validated within the peculiar context of 
the Romanian market. According to our findings, the probability of delisting is decreasing in 
the company’s size. The inherent difficulty to completely acquire companies of large size is a 
common result in the literature. 
One of the previous influences, namely the ownership concentration, creates scope for 
insider trading based on proprietary information and consequently for market misevaluation. 
The  negative  and  significant  coefficient  of  the  Stock  Turnover  variable  lends  additional 
support  to  our  intuition  that  the  delisting  decision  concerns  mainly  public  companies 
obliterated  by  the  investors’  ignorance.  This  finding  is  in  line  with  those  reported  by 
Jackowicz  and  Kowalewski  (2005)  and  Atanasov  et  al.  (2009)  for  other  CEE  emerging 
markets and proves that the absence of scrutiny from small investors could be critical for the 
survival of public companies.  
All in all, our results validate the control and undervaluation hypotheses. The delisting 
practices  prevailing  in  the  Romanian  market  bring  into  attention  the  operations  involving 
control  positions  and  the  subsequent  effects  of  the  low  free  float.  As  privatizing  public 
companies is an arbitrary choice that decisively affects the investment incentives of private 
players, our results provide an empirical proof that the regulation is in reality adapted to fit the 
institutional environment.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we provide additional evidence about the causes of delisting by focusing on 
the expropriation of minority shareholders, one of the main stated concerns as well as an 
empirical regularity found in previous studies on emerging markets (Atanasov et al., 2009; 
Jackowicz  and  Kowalewski,  2005).  Our  approach  emphasizes  the  possibility  that  the 
incentives to take advantage of outside shareholders are explained by the very way the initial 
shareholdings of controlling shareholders were chosen. The interest groups emerged in the 
early privatization weakened the regulatory response to corporate governance failures in the 
Romanian market. Even if the law regulating going private transactions taken as a whole   18
could be public regarding, the details of the fair price standard, the frequent changes of those 
details, as well as the exemptions to the rule in the case of the transactions involving State 
majority or minority ownership make this law little effective in preventing the expropriation 
of minority shareholders. 
The main findings of this study are that delisting is likely to occur especially when (1) the 
block  obtained  by  circumventing  the  market  is  large;  (2)  the  companies  are  more  often 
involved in capital transactions; and (3) the companies are less scrutinized by investors and 
therefore  market  prices  are  less  informative.  In  the  light  of  our  empirical  findings,  the 
regulatory provisions seem to perversely defend the sticky concentrated ownership structures. 
 The  ample  phenomenon  of  delisting  that  experienced  the  Romanian  capital  market, 
including even blue-chips companies, after the issue of the OECD (2001) report brings into 
question the likely effectiveness of the introduction of the squeeze-out rights. Unfortunately, 
the  implementation  of  the  “acquis  communautaires”  expressed  too  often  the  political 
decisions made during privatization and the interests of those shareholders become influential. 
In the long run, beyond the fairness principle, a matter of serious reflection should be the 
shrink of capital markets caused by massive delisting. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics on key explanatory variables 
Indep. variable  N  Mean  St. dev.  Median  Min  Max 
AVAS_major  2437  0.52  .  1.00  0.00  1.00 
AVAS_maxdir  2436  55.85  21.46  50.96  0.46  100.00 
Privatization Rounds  2437  1.23  0.55  1.00  1.00  6.00 
ESOP  2437  0.30  .  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Individual   2437  0.20  .  0.00  0.00  1.00 
First Bid_Submitted  855  0.38  0.47  0.25  0.00  5.84 
First Bid_Listing
a  855  1634.54  918.02  1578.00  0.00  3598.00 
Nb. Bids  855  1.47  0.88  1.00  1.00  12.00 
Bid _Av Price  838  1.78  4.31  1.09  0.00  92.54 
Nb. Capital Changes  1696  1.82  1.26  1.00  1.00  7.00 
Capital Change
a  1693  6.22  41.17  1.56  0.00  1116.07 
Size  2879  16.54  2.31  16.73  7.26  24.67 
ROE  2881  -0.24  2.80  0.01  -110.46  9.24 
Leverage  2878  0.76  1.95  0.47  0.00  53.98 
Asset Turnover  2881  1.12  1.97  0.78  -0.07  77.08 
FATA  2882  0.56  0.27  0.57  0.00  5.41 
Stock turnover  3160  0.47  1.27  0.18  0.00  52.42 
Market Trend
b  3159  1.35  1.75  1.00  0.00  38.84 
 Notes : AVAS_major, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the size of block sold directly by AVAS 
exceeds 50% and 0 otherwise. AVAS_maxdir is the maximum size of the block dealt with AVAS by circumventing 
the stock market. Privatization Rounds represents the total number of privatisation rounds in which the company 
was involved. ESOP/Individual is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the block was sold to the company’s 
employees/physical person and 0 otherwise. First Bid_Submitted represents the ratio between the number of shares 
submitted in the first takeover bid and the number of targeted shares. First Bid_Listed represents the number of days 
between the listing date and the date of the first takeover bid. Nb Bids represents the total number of takeover bids 
made for the company's shares. Bid_Av Price is the ratio between the maximum biding price and the average price 
on the considered period. Nb Capital Changes is the number of times the company has changed its total number of 
shares. Capital Change is the percentage difference between the final number of shares and the number of shares at 
the listing date. Size is the logarithm of total assets. ROE is the return on equity. Leverage is the ratio between the 
debt and total assets. Assets turnover is the ratio between sales and total assets. FATA is the ratio between fixed 
assets and total assets. Stock Turnover is the ratio between the total volume and the average number of shares on the 
considered period. Market Trend is the ratio between last closing price and the average  market price over the 
considered period.   21
 
Table 2. Logistic Regression Analysis of the likelihood that firm delist 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
AVAS_major  0.054  0.257***  0.222**             
  (0.512)  (0.006)  (0.020)         
AVAS_maxdir        0.005***  0.004**  0.006***   
        (0.001)  (0.009)  (0.000)   
Privatization 
Rounds              0.208*** 
              (0.002) 
ESOP  -0.508***  -0. 383***  -0.358***  -0.424***  -0.388***  -0.345***  -0.376*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Individual   0.372***  0.084  0.103  0.040  0.060  0.100  0.115 
  (0.003)  (0.545)  (0.460)  (0.777)  (0.671)  (0.489)  (0.425) 
First Bid_Submitted  0.641***  1.189***  1.233***  1.242***       
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)       
First Bid_Listing
a          0.038***     
          (0.000)     
Nb. Bids            0.600***  0.581*** 
            (0.000)  (0.000) 
Bid _Av Price  0.009  0.034  0.058**  0.056*  0.023  0.011  0.013 
  (0.493)  (0.108)  (0.053)  (0.058)  (0.283)  (0.520)  (0.461) 
Nb. Capital Changes  -0.577***  -0.211***  -0.206***  -0.206***  -0.220***  -0.202***  -0.203*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Capital Change
a  0.026  0.023  0.021  0.021  0.020  0.018  0.016 
  (0.599)  (0.762)  (0.760)  (0.762)  (0.753)  (0.816)  (0.786) 
Size    -1.092***  -1.101***  -1.093***  -1.134***  -1.179***  -1.171*** 
    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ROE    0.016  0.016  0.015  0.016  0.013  0.015 
    (0.354)  (0.353)  (0.372)  (0.358)  (0.435)  (0.339) 
Leverage    0.059  0.058  0.061  0.064  0.074*  0.078* 
    (0.145)  (0.153)  (0.135)  (0.122)  (0.081)  (0.071) 
Asset Turnover    0.137***  0.137***  0.137***  0.126**  0.125**  0.117** 
    (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.018) 
FATA    0.440**  0.435**  0.434**  0.444**  0.429**  0.426** 
    (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.024)  (0.031)  (0.032) 
Stock turnover      -0.095**  -0.091**  -0.076**  -0.104**  -0.125*** 
      (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.031)  (0.018)  (0.008) 
Market Trend
b       0.003   0.002   0.002   0.003   0.002 
      (0.406)  (0.418)  (0.393)  (0.377)  (0.373) 
Intercept  1.126***   8.011***  8.109***  7.954***  8.237***  8.435***  8.450*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Mc Fadden R 
squared  0.096  0.197  0.200  0.201  0.202  0.212  0.212 
Akaike inf. criterion  1.184  1.092  1.090  1.088  1.087  1.072  1.073 
N  3.161  2.731  2.731  2.731  2.731  2.731  2.731 
Notes : AVAS_major, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the size of block sold directly by AVAS 
exceeds  50%  and  0  otherwise.  AVAS_maxdir  is  the  maximum  size  of  the  block  dealt  with  AVAS  by 
circumventing the stock  market. Privatization Rounds represents the total number of privatisation rounds in 
which the company was involved. ESOP/Individual is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the block was 
sold  to  the  company’s  employees/physical  person  and  0  otherwise.  First  Bid_Submitted  represents  the  ratio 
between  the  number  of  shares  submitted  in  the  first  takeover  bid  and  the  number  of  targeted  shares.  First 
Bid_Listed represents the number of days between the listing date and the date of the first takeover bid. Nb Bids 
represents the total number of takeover bids made for the company's shares. Bid_Av Price is the ratio between the 
maximum biding price and the average price on the considered period. Nb Capital Changes is the number of   22
times the company has changed its total number of shares. Capital Change is the percentage difference between 
the final number of shares and the number of shares at the listing date. Size is the logarithm of total assets. ROE 
is the return on equity. Leverage is the ratio between the debt and total assets. Assets turnover is the ratio 
between sales and total assets. FATA is the ratio between fixed assets and total assets. Stock Tturnover is the ratio 
between the total volume and the average number of shares on the considered period. Market Trend is the ratio 
between  last  closing  price  and  the  average  market  price  over  the  considered  period.  Probability  values  are 
reported in the parenthesis. */**/*** denotes significance at 10%/5%/1% level. 
a( x 10-2). 
b (x 10-4) 
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Table 3: Results from Cox Proportional Hazards Regressions 
Indep. Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
AVAS_major  0.950  1.005  0.981         
  (0.273)  (0.922)  (0.720)         
AVAS_maxdir        0.999  0.999  1.000   
        (0.417)  (0.273)  (0.622)   
Privatization Rounds              1.025 
              (0.501) 
ESOP  0.734***  0.780***  0.789***  0.796***  0.797***  0.802***  0.787*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Individual   1.162**  0.982  0.987  0.996  1.005  1.024  1.008 
  (0.013)  (0.792)  (0.840)  (0.952)  (0.938)  (0.731)  (0.903) 
First Bid_Submitted  1.467***  1.561***  1.578***  1.576***       
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)       
First Bid_Listing
a          >1.000***     
          (0.000)     
Nb. Bids            1.252***  1.254*** 
            (0.000)  (0.000) 
Bid _Av Price  >1.000*  >1.000**  >1.000**  >1.000**  >1.000**  >1.000**  >1.000** 
  (0.086)  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.035) 
Nb. Capital Changes  0.637***  0.773***  0.774***  0.774***  0.776***  0.782***  0.781*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Capital Change
a  >1.000**  >1.000***  >1.000***  >1.000***  >1.000***  >1.000***  >1.000*** 
  (0.037)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size    0.759  0.760***  0.760***  0.755***  0.750***  0.750*** 
    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ROE    1.041  1.047*  1.048*  1.049*  1.048*  1.046* 
    (0.093)  (0.069)  (0.065)  (0.059)  (0.071)  (0.081) 
Leverage    0.989  0.989***  0.989***  0.989***  0.989***  0.989*** 
    (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Asset Turnover    1.035  1.037***  1.037***  1.035***  1.035***  1.035*** 
    (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
FATA    1.666  1.679***  1.684***  1.698***  1.684***  1.672*** 
    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Stock turnover      0.949*  0.946*  0.953*  0.930**  0.934** 
      (0.060)  (0.052)  (0.068)  (0.020)  (0.022) 
Market Trend
b      <1.000  <1.000  <1.000  <1.000  <1.000 
         (0.571)  (0.571)  (0.576)  (0.566)  (0.565) 
Number of firms  3160  2729  2729  2729  2729  2729  2729 
Delisted firms  2030  1632  1632  1632  1632  1632  1632 
Log likelihood  -15088.3  -11682.4  -11676.3  -11676.0  -11690.2  -11666.5  -11666.4 
LR  504.9***  997.3***  1009.5***  1010.0***  981.6***  1029.0***  1029.2*** 
This table presents the estimation results from Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) regressions using various sets of 
covariates. For ease the interpretation, results are presented in the log relative-hazard metric, e.g. a hazard ratio 
equal to 2 means that a one-unit change in the covariate doubles the hazard of “failure”, whereas a hazard ratio of .3 
implies that a one-unit change in the covariate cuts the hazard to one-third. P-values are reported in parenthesis, 
below each hazard ratio estimate. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively    24
Table 4: Results from the Generalized Gama Duration Regression 
Indep. Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
AVAS_major  0.009  –0.003  0.006         
  (0.506)  (0.879)  (0.764)         
AVAS_maxdir        +0.000  +0.000  +0.000   
        (0.353)  (0.221)  (0.525)   
Privatization Rounds              –0.006 
              (0.704) 
ESOP  0.105***  0.100***  0.096***  0.091***  0.091***  0.087***  0.093*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Individual   –0.026*  0.007  0.006  0.001  –0.003  –0.010  –0.004 
  (0.099)  (0.787)  (0.831)  (0.961)  (0.910)  (0.719)  (0.868) 
First Bid_Submitted  –0.083***  –0.176***  –0.181***  –0.180***       
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)       
First Bid_Listing
a          –0.000***     
          (0.000)     
Nb. Bids            –0.093***  –0.094*** 
            (0.000)  (0.000) 
Bid _Av Price  –0.000***  –0.000*  –0.000*  –0.000*  –0.000*  –0.000*  –0.000* 
  (0.000)  (0.055)  (0.057)  (0.055)  (0.052)  (0.056)  (0.058) 
Nb. Capital Changes  0.146***  0.100***  0.099***  0.099***  0.099***  0.096***  0.096*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Capital Change
a  –0.000***  –0.000***  –0.000***  –0.000***  –0.000***  –0.000***  –0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size    0.107***  0.106***  0.106***  0.109***  0.112***  0.112*** 
    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ROE    –0.011  –0.013  –0.013  –0.014  –0.012  –0.012 
    (0.167)  (0.142)  (0.136)  (0.118)  (0.159)  (0.166) 
Leverage    0.005***  0.005***  0.005***  0.004***  0.005***  0.005*** 
    (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Asset Turnover    –0.015***  –0.016***  –0.016***  –0.015***  –0.016***  –0.016*** 
    (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
FATA    –0.201***  –0.204***  –0.206***  –0.210***  –0.206***  –0.204*** 
    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Stock turnover      0.021*  0.023**  0.019*  0.031**  0.029** 
      (0.057)  (0.046)  (0.064)  (0.015)  (0.017) 
Market Trend
b      +0.000  +0.000  +0.000  +0.000  +0.000 
      (0.570)  (0.570)  (0.576)  (0.561)  (0.560) 
Intercept  8.239***  6.436***  6.435***  6.422***  6.382***  6.345***  6.360*** 
   (0.000  (0.000  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Ancillary  0.128  0.401  0.402  0.402  0.402  0.406  0.405 
Kappa  4.484***  0.872***  0.866***  0.862***  0.862***  0.838***  0.843*** 
Number of firms  3160  2729  2729  2729  2729  2729  2729 
Delisted firms  2030  1632  1632  1632  1632  1632  1632 
Log likelihood  –2705.7  –1958.7  –1952.7  –1952.3  –1966.5  –1940.9  –1941.0 
LR  431.6***  990.8***  1002.8***  1003.6***  975.2***  1026.5***  1026.2*** 
AIC  5431.5  3947.4  3939.5  3938.7  3967.1  3915.8  3916.0 
This table presents the estimation results from the Generalized Gamma duration regressions using various sets of 
covariates. For computational reasons, it is worth noting that the results presented in this table are expressed in the 
accelerated failure-time metric, e.g. negative coefficient estimates translate into a positive impact on the hazard of 
“failure”, whereas a positive coefficient estimate implies that a change in the covariate decreases the hazard. P-
values are reported in parenthesis, below each coefficient estimate. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively   25
Appendix 2. The main legal texts regulating takeovers and public to private transactions in Romania 











Significant shareholders  5%  10%  10%  10%  10% 
Takeover bid publicity  by mail or announcement in a 
national journal  
announcement in two 
national journals  
announcement in two 
national newspapers during 3 
consecutive days 
announcement in a national 
and a regional newspaper 
announcement in a national 
and a regional newspaper 
Voluntary Public Offer  
Control stake  33%+1  33%+1  33%+1  33%+1  33%+1 
Preliminary announcement  na  na  na  yes  yes 
Minimum bidding price  na  based on the rules imposed 
by CNVM 
a. if possible, the maximum 
price of the price paid for the 
target shares by offeror 
during the last 12 months 
preceding the offer and the 
average market price during 
the last 12 months preceding 
the offer 
based on the rules imposed 
by CNVM 
the maximum price of  the 
highest price paid for the 
target shares by offeror 
during the last 12 months 
preceding the bid and the 
average market price during 
the last 12 months preceding 
the offer   
         b. if not, based on the 
corrected net asset value  
     
Restrictions imposed on 
offeror and the persons acting 
in concert with offeror  
na  the target stocks are 
suspended from transaction 
market transactions involving 
the target stocks are 
forbidden 
it is forbidden to make a new 
bid for the same shares 
during the next 12 months 
following the closing date of 
the actual bid  
transactions involving the 
target stocks are forbidden till 
the bid initiation  
Opinion of the Board of 
Directors of target company 
voluntary recommendation 
for accepting or rejecting the 
offer 
na  na  within the next 5 days from 
the date of preliminary 
announcement, the Board of 
Directors must disclose their 
opinion on the opportunity of 
the offer  
within the next 5 days from 
the date of preliminary 
announcement, the board of 
directors must disclose their 
opinion on the opportunity of 
the bid to shareholders and 
employees  
Restrictions on the decisions of 
the Board of Directors 
na  na  na  after the date of preliminary 
announcement, all decisions 
likely to affect substantially 
the value of assets of target 
are forbidden 
after the date of preliminary 
announcement, all decisions 
likely to affect substantially 
the value of assets of target 
are forbidden     26
Restrictions on the rival offers  na  na  a. the rival bid has to be made 
at least for the same number 
of shares  targeted in the first 
bid 
a. the rival bid has to be made 
at least for the same number 
of shares targeted in the first 
bid 
a. the rival bid has to be made 
at least for the same number 
of shares targeted in the first 
bid 
         b. the document of the rival 
bid has to be filled with the 
CNVM within the 10 
transaction days following 
the beginning date of the first 
bid  
b. the price of the rival bid 
has to exceed the previous 
bidding price by at least 5%. 
b. the document of the new 
offer has to be filled with the 
CNVM within the 10 
transaction days following 
the beginning date of the first 
bid 
         c. all rival bids have a single 
closing date  
c. the document of the new 
offer has to be filled with the 
CNVM within the 10 
transaction days following 
the beginning date of the first 
bid 
c. all the rival bids have the 
same closing date, but not 
later than 60 transaction days 
following the beginning date 
of the first bid 
            d. all the rival bids have the 
same closing date,  but not 
later than 60 transaction days 
following the beginning date 
of the first bid 
d. CNVM organizes an 
auction for designating the 
winning bid; in each auction 
round the price has to be 
higher by 5% than in the 
previous round 
Strict Mandatory Bid Rule 
Majority Position  50%+1  50%+1  50%+1  50%+1  50%+1 
Qualified Majority Position  na  75%+1  75%+1  na  na 
Minimum bidding price  na  based on the rules imposed 
by CNVM 
a. if possible, the maximum 
price between the price paid 
for the targeted shares by the 
offeror during the last 12 
months preceding the offer 
and the average weighted 
market price during the last 
12 months preceding the 
offer 
a. if possible, the price paid 
for the targeted shares by 
offeror during the last 12 
months preceding the offer 
a. if possible, the price paid 
for the targeted shares by 
offeror during the last 12 
months preceding the offer   27
         b. if not, based on the 
corrected net asset value  
b. if not, based on (1) the 
average weighted market 
price during the last 12 
months; (2) the net assets 
value based on the audited 
financial statements; and (3) 
the valuation proposed by an 
independent expert. 
b. if not, based on (1)  the 
average weighted market 
price during the last 12 
months; (2) the net assets 
value based on the audited 
financial statements; and (3) 
the valuation proposed by an 
independent expert. 
Opinion of the Board of 
Directors of target company 
voluntary recommendation 
for accepting or rejecting the 
offer 
mandatory disclosure of its 
opinion to the offeror, the 
CNVM and the market within 
5 days from the preliminary 
announcement of the offer  
   mandatory disclosure of its 
opinion to the offeror, the 
CNVM and the market within 
5 days from the preliminary 
announcement of the offer  
mandatory disclosure of its 
opinion to the offeror, the 
CNVM and the market within 
5 days from the preliminary 
announcement of the offer  
Restrictions on the decisions of 
the Board of Directors 
na  after the date of preliminary 
announcement 
a. all transactions with the 
target stocks have to be 
disclosed to the CNVM and 
market  
   after the date of preliminary 
announcement  
a. all transactions with the 
target stocks have to be 
disclosed to the CNVM and 
market  
after the date of preliminary 
announcement  
a. all transactions with the 
target stocks have to be 
disclosed to the CNVM and 
market  
      b. all decisions likely to affect 
substantially the asset value 
of target, like increasing the 
share capital, new issues of 
securities providing the right 
to subscribe to shares or to 
convert the securities into 
shares, the use as collateral or 
the transfer of assets 
representing 1/3 of the total 
assets, are forbidden 
   b. all decisions likely to affect 
substantially the asset value 
of target, like increasing the 
share capital, new issues of 
securities providing the right 
to subscribe to shares or to 
convert the securities into 
shares, the use as collateral or 
the transfer of assets 
representing 1/3 of the total 
assets, are forbidden 
b. all decisions likely to affect 
substantially the asset value 
of target, like increasing the 
share capital, new issues of 
securities providing the right 
to subscribe to shares or to 
convert the securities into 
shares, the use as collateral or 
the transfer of assets 
representing 1/3 of the total 
assets, are forbidden 
Restrictions on the rival offers  na  a. the rival bid has to be made 
at least for the same number 
of shares targeted in the first 
bid 
a. the rival bid has to be made 
at least for the same number 
of shares targeted in the first 
bid 
a. the rival bid has to be made 
at least for the same number 
of shares targeted in the first 
bid 
a. the rival bid has to be made 
at least for the same number 
of shares targeted in the first 
bid 
      b. the document of the new 
bid has to be filled with the 
CNVM within the 10 
transaction days following 
the beginning date of the first 
bid  
b. the document of the new 
bid has to be filled with the 
CNVM within the 10 
transaction days following 
the beginning date of the first 
bid 
b. the document of the new 
bid has to be filled with the 
CNVM within the 10 
transaction days following 
the beginning date of the first 
bid 
b. the document of the new 
bid has to be filled with the 
CNVM within the 10 
transaction days following 
the beginning date of the first 
bid   28
      c. a single closing date for all 
rival bids 
c. a single closing date for all 
rival bids 
c. a single closing date for all 
rival bids 
c. a single closing date for all 
rival bids 
               d. CNVM organizes an 
auction for designating the 
winning bid; in each auction 
round the price has to be 
higher by 5% than in the 
previous round 
Public to private transactions 
Conditions to transform a 
public company in a private 
company 
if after the conclusion of a 
share buy-back public offer, 
the company has less than 
500 shareholders or its share 
capital is lower than 1 billion 
ROL 
a. the majority shareholder 
owns at least 90% of the total 
shares of the company and 
makes a public offer aiming 
at transforming the company 
into a private company 
mandatory delisting when the 
majority shareholders owns 
more than 90% of the total 
number of shares 
following a public offer, a 
shareholder has a squeeze out 
right if  
a. he owns at least 95% of the 
total number of shares of the 
company; 
following a public offer, a 
shareholder has a squeeze out 
right if  
a. he owns at least 95% of the 
total number of shares of the 
company; 
      b. based on the decision of 
the General Assembly of 
Shareholders when the total 
number of shareholders is 
lower than 100 and the share 
capital is lower than 100.000 
euros 
   b. at least 90% of the 
outstanding shares have been 
tendered in a previous 
purchasing public offer 
b. at least 90% of the 
outstanding shares have been 
tendered in a previous 
purchasing public offer 
Available period for 
organizing a buyout 
transaction  
na  12 months after the 
acquisition of a stake higher 
than 90% 
12 months after the 
acquisition of a stake higher 
than 90% 
na  na 
Buyout price  based on the net assets value  the mean of at least two out 
of the three following prices: 
a. the average market price 
during the 12 months 
preceding the offer; 
valuated by an independent 
experts, at least equal to the 
average price of:  
a. the average market price 
during the 12 months 
preceding the offer; 
fair price standard: 
a. the price accepted in the 
previous offer assuring more 
than 90% of the target shares 
is considered a fair price 
fair price standard: 
a. the price accepted in the 
previous voluntary or 
mandatory bid, assuring more 
than 90% of the target shares 
is considered a fair price 
      b. the net assets value based 
on the IAS 
b. the net assets value based 
on the IAS 
b. in all other circumstances, 
the fair price will be 
established by an 
independent expert in respect 
with the international 
valuation standards.  
b. in all other circumstances, 
the fair price will be 
established by an 
independent expert in respect 
with the international 
valuation standards.    29
      c. the highest price paid by 
offeror during the previous 
12 months  
c. the highest price paid by 
the offeror during the 
previous 12 months 
     
Restrictions imposed on 
transactions with the target 
stocks 
na  the transactions with target 
stocks are suspended after the 
date of announcement  
the transactions with target 
stocks are suspended after the 
date of preliminary 
announcement 
na  na 
Rights of the minority 
shareholders 
na  the minority shareholders 
owning at least 75% of the 
free float can contest the 
offer price  
the offer price can be 
contested 
the right to ask the majority 
shareholder owning at least 
95% of the total shares of the 
company to buy out the 
remaining shares at a fair 
price 
the right to ask the majority 
shareholder owning at least 
95% of the total shares of the 
company to buy out the 
remaining shares at a fair 
price 
Obligations of minority 
shareholders  
na  na  na  in the case of the sell out 
right, the costs raised by the 
valuation of the buyout price 
is borne with the minority 
shareholders 
a. the minority shareholders 
has the explicit obligation to 
sell their shares to a major 
shareholder having a squeeze 
out right 
               b. in the case of the sell out 
right, the costs raised by the 
valuation of the buyout price 
is borne with by the minority 
shareholders 
Resolution of contested buy-
out bids 
na  a. if the new price is higher 
with at least 20% than the 
initial price a new valuation 
is imposed; 
a. if the new price is higher 
by at least 20% than the 
initial price a new valuation 
is imposed; 
na  na 
      b. if not, the offer price is 
equal to the mean of prices 
proposed by the independent 
experts representing the 
majority and minority 
shareholders, respectively. 
b. if not, the offer price is 
equal to the mean of prices 
valuated by the independent 
experts representing the 
majority and minority 
shareholders, respectively. 
     
Excepted transactions  na  the acquisition of the stake 
triggering the MBR  
a. within privatization 
the acquisition of the stake 
triggering the MBR  
a. within privatization 
the acquisition of the stake 
triggering the MBR  
a. within privatization 
the acquisition of the stake 
triggering the MBR  
a. within privatization 
      b. from the Minister of 
Finance, following the 
execution of the budgetary 
claims  
b. from the Minister of 
Finance, following the 
execution of the budgetary 
claims 
b. from the Minister of 
Finance, following the 
execution of the budgetary 
claims;  
b. from the Minister of 
Finance, following the 
execution of the budgetary 
claims;    30
            c. the transfer of shares 
between the mother company 
and its subsidiaries 
c. the transfer of shares 
between the mother company 
and its subsidiaries 
            d. following a voluntary 
public offer for these shares, 
having as object of the offer 
all the shares of the company 
d. following a voluntary 
public offer for these shares, 
having as object of the offer 
all the shares of the company 
Multiple classes of shares  na  na  na  the obligations imposed to 
buyout transactions are 
distinctively applicable to 
various classes of shares  
the obligations imposed to 
buyout transactions are 
distinctively applicable to 
various classes of shares  
Remarks   the takeover regulation 1996 
is founded on the market law 
1994 
the obligation to buy out the 
minority shareholders is not 
applicable in companies 
where the Government owns 
at least 90% of the total 
shares 
the takeover regulation 2003 
is founded on the market law 
2002 
a. the two distinct terms 
regarding the offers for a 
control position and for a 
majority position are no 
longer used; 
a. the transactions made by 
offeror with the target stocks 
outside the bid have to be 
concluded at a price higher 
than the bidding price and no 
later than 8 days till the end 
of the bidding period  
            b. the obligation to refrain 
from transactions with the 
target stocks concerns also 
the intermediary of the offer 
b. the securities regulation 
2006 is founded on the 
market law 2004 
            c. the mandatory bid rule is 
applicable to shareholders 
owning 33% of the voting 
rights at the date of the actual 
rule and who had not 
respected the conditions 
imposed by the rules 
applicable at the date such a 
stake had been acquired. 
  
 